Introduction

Sexual violence constitutes one of the most unpunished crimes. This is due to several reasons,[1] including the difficulty of proving them, a prevailing tendency to blame the victim and question her credibility, and the fear and terror that these crimes cause for the victims and survivors, which can deter their disclosure.[2]

 

Criminal justice – as well as family justice – is one of the areas that present the most issues at the intersection of law and society. Hence, the conviction and sentencing process, with its determination of the crime and punishment and guilt or innocence, is a social phenomenon that in and of itself needs to be studied in its context.[3] Yet most studies on rape cases in Lebanon are limited to either documenting the crime’s human and social effects[4] or to the legal aspect, particularly technical analysis of the Penal Code.[5] This article therefore attempts to understand rape and sexual violence cases through judicial practice using the sociolegal approach, which involves analyzing the law and legal phenomena and deconstructing their relationship with the structures and situation of society in general.

 

How do Lebanese courts handle sexual violence cases, with all the prejudices they involve? What values does the judiciary protect via its intervention in these crimes, and on what factors does the court bench focus? How does the Lebanese judiciary adapt to the difficulty of proving sexual  crimes? How does the legal system intervene in minors’ lives and relationships? How does class and social discrimination manifest itself in these rulings? Which victims reach the judiciary, and who are the defendants? What are the common denominators among them, and what behavioral patterns of judges can be deduced? What influence do people’s identities and backgrounds have on judicial practices?

 

This paper proposes some answers and hypotheses for these questions by analyzing a sample of judicial rulings issued in 2016, 2017, and 2018 by the Beirut Criminal Court and the Mount Lebanon Criminal Court, especially those based on articles 503 to 513 of the Penal Code (“Chapter 7: Crimes Breaching Public Morals and Ethics, Section 1: Assault on Honor”). These articles address rape and sexual assault, which the law defines as “indecent acts” [‘amal munafiya li-l-hishma]. The sample includes 67 rulings in Mount Lebanon and seven in Beirut,[6] totaling 74.[7] Note that the Penal Code does not use the term “rape”; rather, it refers to “coercion into intercourse using violence or threats”. The law also distinguishes between intercourse, which the rulings usually interpret as vaginal rape (which encompasses 22 cases in the sample), and indecent and obscene acts, which the rulings mostly interpret as anal rape or other, nonpenetrative sexual acts (which encompasses 35 cases in the sample). Ten rulings in the sample acquitted the defendant, while seven convicted the defendant only of other crimes unrelated to rape (e.g. theft or violation of the Law on Foreigners).

 

Below, we present our preliminary observations concerning these rulings, though we must emphasize two points: firstly, the sample studied is limited in terms of time and place and therefore does not represent all orientations in the Lebanese judiciary. Secondly, we obtained the rulings without the other case documents and without interviewing the actors involved (e.g. the judges, lawyers, or victims), so the analysis may have missed important information.

 

Observation 1: Who Are the Victims and Defendants? Few Affluents and Many Minors

The sample contains only the rulings issued by the Criminal Court and therefore does not include all the cases that were dismissed by the Public Prosecution or at the investigation stage[8] or that are still being tried. This explains the high conviction rate among the rulings.[9] As cases must pass through various judicial authorities (Public Prosecution and investigating judges), those that lack clear proof are eliminated and only the strongest ones are prosecuted.

 

The sample includes 86 victims, though many of the rulings mention “many other victims” not represented or identified in the case. This indicates that victims rarely resort to the judiciary and that investigating judges are not sufficiently thorough in their investigations. As for the defendants, they numbered 83, of whom 64 were tried in person and 19 in absentia.

 

A preliminary analysis of the identities of the victims and defendants reveals two things:

 

The Middle and Affluent Classes Are Nearly Absent

 

The rulings in the sample do not provide all the details of the crime and its circumstances or the social background of the defendants and victims. However, social status can be deduced from information that does appear, such as place of residence, occupation, and education level.

 

Most victims and alleged offenders in the sample are evidently from poor social groups. For example, most of the crimes occurred in poor and crowded residential areas (“they were living in Shatila camp”, “al-Salam neighborhood”, “she works in a shop in Bourj Hammoud”, “residing in Ouzai, in the Saint Simon neighborhood, behind the Ghazal wedding hall”).[10] A large percentage of the defendants are foreign workers and therefore belong to the poorest and most vulnerable groups.[11] Most cases pertain to assaults by relatives or members of the immediate family (e.g. the father, brother, or uncle) or assaults by strangers unconnected to the victims (e.g. a construction worker and a girl living in the neighboring building). Very few involve attacks among people with previous social ties (e.g. work, friendship, or study). Even in the cases in which the victim appears to be from the middle or affluent classes, the defendant is always from a lower class.

 

This does not necessarily mean that the affluent classes are immune to or innocent of rape or that rape rates among poor groups are higher than the overall rates in society. Rather, the absence of affluent groups from the judicial arena indicates a disparity between the judicial reality and social reality. Two hypotheses may explain why sexual violence cases in the Criminal Court are limited to the most vulnerable groups and affluent social groups are absent.

 

The first is that victims from affluent classes usually do not file allegations with the authorities. While this could be explained via a lack of trust in the judicial authority, it could also be explained, in particular, on class-related grounds: the appearance of social cohesion in the affluent classes, as well as the system of common interests among them, may deter victims from resorting to the judiciary. This hypothesis is strengthened by the aforementioned absence of cases involving assaults among people with previous social ties.

 

The second hypothesis, which concerns judicial performance and the perceptions that govern it, is that judges are influenced by the prevalent social stereotyping of offenders (e.g. as Syrian, poor, or construction workers). In this manner, the judiciary may play a role in “filtering” the cases before they reach the Criminal Court such that only people from low-income groups are charged. The working classes are usually portrayed as violent and more susceptible to commit sex crimes,[12] so an educated, affluent defendant does not match the criminal stereotype and is more difficult to convict.

 

This hypothesis is strengthened by the disparity in the ability of affluent groups and poorer groups to defend themselves. A defendant who enjoys social, political, material, intellectual, and cultural privileges (such as Lebanese nationality or the ability to hire a lawyer) can usually present a more believable story to the investigating judge and therefore has a better chance of avoiding charges before the Criminal Court.[13]

 

This observation stems from several studies from around the world showing that most defendants in sexual violence cases are from low-income groups[14] and that they usually receive harsher sentences than middle-class defendants.[15] In this manner, the class system works to project negative values on “others” such that the other from the “uncivilized violent working class” becomes a repository for the traits that the middle class fears or rejects.[16]

 

Of course, these observations remain mere hypotheses and indicate a field of research in need of further exploration.

 

Most of the Victims Are Minors (Male or Female)

 

In the sample, 59% of the victims are minors (45% male and 55% female) while 41% are adults (95% female and 5% male).

 

The number of cases pertaining to assault on adult women (33) is low in comparison to the high figures for sexual crimes against women in Lebanon (229 incidents were reported to police in 2019 alone).[17] The explanation could be that women are not resorting to the judiciary because of a lack of faith in the justice system or the difficulty of proving the rape and the fear that they will be blamed and socially stigmatized for it. Their complaints may also be getting eliminated at the investigation stage, as previously explained.

 

On the other hand, the fact that most rape cases before the criminal courts pertain to minors could be explained by the protective perspective on them. Protecting childhood is one of the most socially agreed-upon and perhaps least problematic subjects. Culturally, intercourse with a child is considered a “mental illness”. A child, according to the prevalent understanding of childhood, is “innocent” and “helpless”. Most importantly, the defendant cannot justify the assault on the basis that the minor consented, i.e. the justification found in most cases involving adult women. Moreover, while adult women may hesitate to approach the judiciary because they fear for their “reputation” and the social stigma that could result (especially if the case is dismissed and they cannot provide proof that the assault was nonconsensual), for the aforementioned reasons this fear is not a factor in cases involving children. Hence, resorting to the judiciary to protect children from sexual violence is easier than resorting to it to protect women.

 

Observation 2: In the Absence of Conclusive Evidence, How Does the Court Make Its Decision?

The issue of proof is one of the greatest obstacles in rape cases. By nature, these crimes occur in private and are difficult to prove with conclusive evidence. Hence, judges have broad leeway to acquit or convict the defendant based on how convinced they are by the circumstantial evidence presented. What factors seem to affect the judges’ thinking and convictions? In this regard, we shall focus on the sample’s cases involving rape against women.

 

Social sciences refer to the concept of “rape myths”,[18] a set of misconceptions and erroneous beliefs about rape that are prevalent on a wide scale and aim to deny or justify sexual assault on women.[19] These myths are based on a number of stereotypical ideas that stem from a patriarchal view of women and their role in society. The most prominent include that rape is impossible as a woman can prevent it, that rape victims “ask for it” or seduce the man,[20] and that men rape women because of an “an uncontrollable instinct”.[21] Besides their social impact, these myths have clear effects on the authorities’ handling of rape survivors and the extent to which they are believed. These stereotypical ideas undoubtedly bolster violence against women by victim-blaming and excusing the assailant or justifying his action.

 

Hence, to what extent does the Lebanese judiciary contribute to the reproduction of stereotypical views on rape? Based on what societal values and what view of women does it do so? And what groups are most exposed to prejudices?

 

The Behaviors, Virginity, and Sexual History of the “Liberal” Woman

 

One of the sample’s rulings involves an oriental dancer who filed against a person whom she said was close to her and, after arguments broke out between them, raped her in her chalet. She presented a medical report confirming the rape. The court acquitted the defendant based on several factors, including that the victim waited some time before filing the case and contradictions in her testimony. Regardless of the details of the case, the court’s analysis displayed dangerous stereotypical views and re-enshrined a patriarchal system that underpins sexual violence. The ruling stated:

 

“Noting that the plaintiff is a liberal and open [mutaharrira wa-munfatiha] woman as required by the nature of her work – she is an oriental dancer also well versed in foreign dancing who works in several hotels in Lebanon and abroad – and that all these facts, taking into account all the above, create doubt and ambiguity over the present complaint…”

 

The same ruling, quoting the defendant’s testimony that the sex was consensual, also stated, “[The defendant] declared that he actually did have a relationship with the plaintiff and was normally having sex with her and that she has a big libido.”

 

This ruling shows how sexual violence cases are turned into a theater for judging the women victims’ behaviors. Rape cases, particularly those involving adult women, often involve a discussion of the victim’s consent to intercourse with the offender. Usually, this consent or lack thereof is ascertained by assessing the victim’s identity and behaviors or, as researcher Alison Phipps says, her “respectability”. There is a presumption that women who do not comply with socially agreed-upon standards of respectability have given perpetual consent to be sexually violated.[22] Thus, these standards are employed as a tool not only for controlling women and classifying and discriminating among them but also for recharacterizing the acts committed against them and ultimately denying their right to justice.

 

Thus, a woman’s “morals” and her conformity to the prevailing values and customs take a central position in the case and become a standard that determines how “responsible” she is for the rape. In other words, the victim has to prove that she is conservative or “respectable” to be believed, and when she cannot do so, the court assumes that she must be at least partially responsible for what happened to her.[23] In such cases, the trial often becomes a trial of the plaintiff woman’s reputation.

 

In the same vein, the issue of the hymen occupies significant space in the sample’s rulings as it is discussed extensively, with references to the victim’s virginity or lack thereof and whether the rape tore her hymen.

 

The rulings also include intimate details about the intercourse or sexual act that, according to the court, are evidence of the victim’s virginity or lack thereof. For example, one ruling stated, “Because of his sexual urges, he removed his daughter’s clothing and had sex with her, and he did not see blood”.[24] This observation can be historically contextualized: in several laws, particularly English law, the crime of rape required that the victim be a virgin,[25] which reflected a reluctance to consider a woman who has not previously abstained from sex as a sexual victim.

 

This “obsession” with virginity is evidence more of an effort to protect traditional values (the hypothesis we advanced earlier) than of an effort to protect women and their bodies.

 

Rape Amidst the Practice of Prostitution

 

One of the rulings states that the defendant had intercourse with a female minor. The ruling’s grounds indicate that the intercourse occurred in the context of prostitution, that her father – who is “the biggest prostitution operator in Lebanon” – was “intimidating her with electricity and [threats of] murder”, and that the defendant was the father’s partner in the operation. The accused was convicted under Penal Code articles 527 (depending on another person’s prostitution) and 505 (intercourse with a minor),[26] not 503 (compulsion into intercourse using violence or threats). The court apparently deemed that engaging in prostitution with a minor is akin to intercourse and not rape. It thereby ignored the circumstances of the case, namely that the minor was coerced into prostitution and her father had been tried on this basis. Does the court mean to say that practicing prostitution negates rape, even when the prostitution is coerced?

 

This observation is connected to a general tendency to assume that sex workers consent to all forms of sex and that intercourse through violence is therefore part of the job of prostitution. Women are thus divided into two categories: “those with whom there are no prohibitions on having sex” (such as sex workers),[27] and “those with whom sex is prohibited” categorically, such as virgins (hence the focus on the virginity issue). The consent of some women to some sexual acts thereby transforms into consent to all forms of sexual activity.[28]

 

Domestic Workers Are Not Victims?

 

The sample contained five rulings in which the victims were domestic workers of various foreign nationalities, only two of which convicted the defendant. In comparison to the other rulings, these rulings display several issues and contradictions concerning light sentences, grounds that reveal prejudices, and an even an unfair burden of proof placed on the victim.

 

From one angle, the two rulings that convicted the defendant handed down light sentences not commensurate with the gravity of the offense. One of the rulings stated:

 

“Whereas the court has found… that the defendant abducted and raped… and violently robbed her, smuggled foreigners from and to Lebanon, and demanded a ransom for her release, which constitute the felony of articles 503, 569, and 638 of the Penal Code and the misdemeanor of Article 600 of the Penal Code and Article 32 of the Law on Foreigners, and he must be criminalized and convicted under them.”

 

The court found that the accused had abducted the victim and taken her to Syrian territory – where he raped her – as part of a human trafficking network yet sentenced him to just three years of imprisonment, including time served.[29]

 

From another angle, the grounds of one of the rulings indicate that the investigating judge tasked the plaintiff with submitting detailed evidence of the alleged events. The court then relied on the worker’s nonsubmission of the documents corroborating her rape to acquit the defendant. It should be noted that this ruling, while showing the pivotal role played by the investigating judge in rape cases, is the only one in which the victim was tasked with substantiating her allegations in such detail. The ruling stated:

 

“The investigating judge tasked the plaintiff with clarifying who took the pictures of her presented in the file, whether these pictures were taken abroad, how they were obtained, and the date that they were taken, in addition to tasking the plaintiff’s attorney with providing the medical reports he mentioned in the preliminary investigation, writing a letter to the Philipine embassy in Lebanon for information about whether the plaintiff had informed it of any assault on her, and serving the plaintiff with the attestation attributed to her and presented in the file by way of the aforementioned embassy so that an attestation by her to the accuracy of its content could be added to the file… Whereas subsequently, and given what was presented above, particularly the failure to specify the date and location of the defendant’s pictures or the means whereby they were sent to Lebanon if they were taken abroad…”

 

In another case, the worker, who suffered a period of poor health, collapsed in the employer’s home and was taken to hospital. She told her sister that she had been raped by a carpenter who was working in the home. Notably, the victim’s sponsor also filed against the accused alongside the victim’s action. Yet, even though the plaintiff’s poor health was established and despite her sponsor’s testimony, the court ultimately acquitted the defendant. While we are not in a position to assess the outcome of the ruling, we can say with certainty that the ruling’s analysis contains many stereotypical views. On one hand, the ruling, quoting the plaintiff’s testimony, stated that, “It was not her first time practicing [sex] as she has a boyfriend in her country”, implying that the plaintiff’s sexual activity or lack thereof impacts her credibility as a victim. Moreover, the ruling mentioned the defendant’s confession to intercourse with the victim by stating that she was the one to “hit on him” and that he “got aroused”.

 

The final case is the best example of the obstacles that obstruct domestic workers’ access to justice in general under the Kafala system. The victim is a domestic worker who suffered a rape attempt. The facts of the ruling state that the accused “assaulted her, brandished a knife against her, threatened her, drove her into a bedroom, and attempted to rape her, grabbing her legs. The plaintiff got away, and a resident saw her and gave her pants to wear”. Yet once again, the ruling acquitted the defendant for insufficient evidence, mentioning that the victim had been tried in absentia because she did not attend the trial hearings. Hence, she was probably deported without being able to exercise her right to litigate.

 

These rulings may therefore indicate that the judiciary is soft on sexual crimes against domestic workers and skeptical of their narratives. Of course, this orientation is made all the graver by the obstacles that the Kafala system imposes on the workers and the fact that most are compelled to leave the country [before they can complete their litigation]. It can also be attributed to a widespread tendency to question the credibility of working-class women and to consider subjection to violence part of the risks of their work. American author Susan Brownmiller mentions, for example, that it was historically difficult, if not impossible, to guarantee justice for working-class women who had been raped even though men from the same social class were the most liable to be tried and convicted.[30] Explaining this difficulty, she notes that working-class women do not conform to traditional feminine behavior and gender roles because they are in the “public sphere” designated for men. The female worker thereby becomes responsible for any harm done to her.[31]

 

Observation 3: Minors’ Sexuality Confuses the Courts

The rulings pertaining to child victims indicate an extremely important issue, namely how the criminal judiciary handles their sexuality when intercourse with a minor is criminalized under Article 505 of the Penal Code while most personal status laws permit minors to marry. In this area, we have a number of comments,[32] the most prominent being the following.

 

Marriage as Cause to Discontinue Proceedings

 

In two rulings from the sample, proceedings against the defendant under Article 505 were discontinued because of a marriage contract between him and the female minor. In one of these cases, the marriage contract was verbal (i.e. a mut’a or “pleasure” marriage). One ruling stated:

 

“Whereas the minor is the accused’s wife, as established by the copy of the marriage contract presented in the file;

 

And whereas although Article 505 of the Penal Code punishes intercourse with a minor below 15 years of age, Article 503 of the Penal Code punishes sex with a person other than the wife, not with the wife, so the elements of Article 505 of the Penal Code are not met and proceedings against the defended must be discontinued in this regard;

 

And whereas the defendant’s act of abducting the minor without deception or violence in order to contract the marriage constitutes the misdemeanor of Article 516 of the Penal Code, and he must be convicted under it;”[33]

 

The other ruling stated:

 

“Hence, her contradictory statements cannot be relied upon as conclusive evidence that the accused did the act imputed to him. It is illogical for a person to have sex with a woman whom he considers his lawful wife in the home of a family to which he personally brought her to protect her. Moreover, it is established that when he brought her to his brother’s home, he did not touch her, and he could have done so, especially as the house was empty. Additionally, the disagreement arose between the accused and the minor because he wanted to take her to his home on the basis that she is his wife given the verbal marriage contract existing between them”.[34]

 

While the first defendant was acquitted on the grounds of a marriage contract even though the minor was no older than 13, the second defendant – who confessed to having sex with the minor after a verbal marriage (i.e. mut’a) was contracted – was acquitted for insufficient evidence. Hence, in these two cases, the marriage contract – even if the court acknowledged that it was mut’a, i.e. verbal and temporary – blocked any questioning of the child’s will not just to have intercourse but even to enter the marriage itself. Consequently, the rape proceedings against the defendant were ultimately discontinued.

 

In this manner, the law places symbolic limits on adolescents’ sexuality: while an adolescent who has [extramarital] sex is seen as an innocent, deceived child and the other person must be punished even if the act is proven consensual, an adolescent who marries (irrespective of how young the adolescent is or the circumstances of the marriage) becomes an independent sexual being that can make decisions whose circumstances will not be subject to any scrutiny. The law has thereby placed prohibitions on minors’ sexuality not only to protect them but also to control them. Consequently, legal practice becomes ambiguous, both criminalizing a minor’s sexual activity and allowing a minor to marry. The court plays a role in reinforcing and reproducing this ambiguity by developing a different understanding of adolescence in each context.

 

This approach appears to be aimed not necessarily at protecting minors and securing their needs individually but at protecting the concept of childhood and the social system that generally governs it: on one hand, this system prohibits the “scourge” of extramarital sex and promotes the repression of such relationships, and on the other hand, the system promotes control over adolescents’ sexuality and molds it into the desired social and legal framework, namely marriage. The problem therefore is not “intercourse with a minor” so much as it is the issue of extramarital intercourse and protecting “public morals”. Thus, the principles of the child’s best interest become a gateway for molding minors’ lives to social and political legacies and society’s conception of “appropriate” and inappropriate,[35] and these cases become an opportunity for the authorities to regulate minors’ lives and create the “ideal adolescent” who conforms to society’s moral values.

 

This article is an edited translation from Arabic.

 

 

[1] Kimberly A. Lonsway and Louise F. Fitzgerald, “Rape Myths: In Review”, Psychology of Women Quarterly, vol. 18, is. 2, 1994, p. 136.

[2] Tatiana Lebbos, “Faransa Ta’tamidu Qawa’id Akthar Murunatan fi Ithbat al-Jara’im al-Jinsiyya: Hakadha Nahmi al-Dahaya”, The Legal Agenda, 8 May 2020.

[3] Cyrus Tata, “Accountability for the Sentencing Decision Process – Towards a New Understanding”, in Cyrus Tata and Neil Hutton (eds.), Sentencing and Society: International Perspectives, Ashgate Publishing, 2002, p. 399-428; and Françoise Vanhamme, La rationalité de la peine: Enquête au tribunal correctionnel, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2009.

[4] Ghida Anani, “Dimensions of Gender-Based Violence Against Syrian Refugees in Lebanon”, Forced Migration Review, no. 44, 2013, p. 75-78.

[5] United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA), United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women), and United Nations Development Program (UNDP), “Lebanon Gender Justice and the Law”, 2018; and UNDP, UNFPA, and UN Women, “Gender-Related Laws, Policies and Practices in Lebanon”, 2018.

[6] Four rulings were excluded from the sample, one from Beirut and three from Mount Lebanon. These rulings were issued in absentia and subsequently overturned following a trial in presence during the years encompassed by the sample.

[7] These rulings were obtained under an access-to-information request sent to the first presidents of the criminal courts in Beirut and Mount Lebanon. They were identified, copied, and supplied to us by judicial staff. However, because of the lack of computerization in the courts, we cannot be certain that the sample includes all rulings issued in the years mentioned.

[8] Under the Code of Criminal Procedure, before reaching the Criminal Court, criminal cases pass through the investigating judge, who conducts all investigations and issues an indictment, and then the Indictment Chamber, which issues another indictment and refers the case to the Criminal Court.

[9] The conviction rate was 67% in rulings issued in presence and 100% in rulings issued in absentia.

[10] Criminal Court in Mount Lebanon, 28 May 2018.

[11] 47% of defendants are Syrian, Palestinian, Sudanese, or Egyptian foreign workers.

[12] Joanna Bourke, Rape: A History from 1860 to the Present, Virago Press, London, 2007, p. 121-125.

[13] Amedeo Cottino and Maria-Grazia Fischer, “Pourquoi l’inegalite devant la loi ?”, Deviance et Societe, vol. 20, no. 3, 1996, p. 199-214.

[14] Susan Brownmiller, Against Our Will: Men, Women, and Rape, Fawcett Columbine, 1975, p. 174, 181, 195, 348-349.

[15] Elizabeth Anne Stanko, Intimate Intrusions: Women’s Experience of Male Violence, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1985, p. 91.

[16] Alison Phipps, “Rape and Respectability: Ideas about Sexual Violence and Social Class”, Sociology, vol. 43, is. 4, 2009, p. 667-683.

[17] Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation, “al-I’tida’at al-Jinsiyya bayna al-Arqam al-Sadima wa-Sifah al-Qurba”, 12 November 2017 (based on statistics from the General Directorate of Internal Security).

[18] Brownmiller, Against Our Will, op. cit.

[19] Lonsway and Fitzgerald, “Rape Myths: In Review”, op. cit., p. 133-164.

[20] In 1980, Martha Burt developed the first study to propose a scale for determining the extent to which individuals accept or believe in “rape myths” (the “Rape Myth Acceptance Scale” or RMA). See Martha R. Burt, “Cultural Myths and Supports for Rape”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, vol. 38, no. 2, February 1980, p. 217-230.

[21] Julia R. Schwendinger and Herman Schwendinger, “Rape Myths: In Legal, Theoretical, and Everyday Practice”, Crime and Social Justice, no. 1, 1974, p. 18-26.

[22] Phipps, “Rape and Respectability”, op. cit., p. 10.

[23] Stanko, Intimate Intrusions, op. cit.

[24] Mount Lebanon Criminal Court, 22 May 2018.

[25] Brownmiller, op. cit., p. 23-29.

[26] Mount Lebanon Criminal Court, 27 April 2018.

[27] Sophie Day, “What Counts as Rape? Physical Assault and Broken Contracts: Contrasting Views of Rape among London Sex Workers” in Penelope Harvey and Peter Gow (eds.), Sex and Violence: Issues in Representation and Experience, Routledge, London, 1994, p. 185.

[28] Sue Lees, Carnal Knowledge: Rape on Trial, Hamish Hamilton, London, 1996, p. 129.

[29] Mount Lebanon Criminal Court, 12 July 2018.

[30] Phipps, op. cit., p. 667-683.

[31] Brownmiller, op. cit., p. 28-29.

[32] Lama Karame, “Iqtirah Qanun hawla Tazwij al-Atfal: Min Ajl Warsha Tashri’iyya Akthar Waqi’iyyatan”, The Legal Agenda, 27 March 2020.

[33] Mount Lebanon Criminal Court, 15 November 2018.

[34] Mount Lebanon Criminal Court, 16 February 2017.

[35] Daniel Monk, “Childhood and Law: In Whose ‘Best Interests’?” in Mary Jane Kehily (ed.), An Introduction to Childhood Studies, 2nd edition, Open University Press, Berkshire, 2009.